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ON OMNISCIENCE 
J ames Patrick Downey 
Traditionally, omniscience has been taken to imply knowing all true propo-
sitions. Recently, it has been suggested that there are some true propositions 
that God cannot possibly know. There may well be propositional content in 
certain knowledge of "what it is like." For instance, we may be able to fill 
in the blank in 'Being ignorant is like ___ ' so that this expresses a true 
proposition. Selmer Bringsjord has considered certain assumptions about 
what is required in order to have such knowledge, and has suggested that 
having this knowledge is not logically possible for God. Paralleling revised 
definitions of omnipotence, he suggests re-defining omniscience in terms of 
what God can possibly know. I argue that on the assumptions he considers, 
this new definition will still require that God do what it is logically impossible 
that God do. I suggest that the assumptions be questioned. 
A current line of thought about omniscience goes as follows. To be omniscient 
should not be defined as to know all true propositions, since there seem to 
be some true propositions which it is not logically possible that God know. 
For example, it may very well be that the blank in 'Being ignorant is like 
___ ' can be filled in so that the whole expresses a true proposition that 
God could not possibly know. And, we should not require that God do what 
it is logically impossible that God do. 
Allowing that these assumptions may be true, Selmer Bringsjord has sug-
gested the following revised definition: 
(D) s is omniscient =df :Jp (OKsp == Ksp).l 
I believe we should interpret this as restricting 'p' to true propositions. Oth-
erwise it implies that an omniscient being must know all propositions that it 
can possibly know. But, while it is possible that I know that my pen is red 
all over now, and it is also possible that I know that my pen is blue all over 
now, it is not possible to know both. 
We can make the qualification to true propositions explicit by changing the 
definition to 
(D') s is omniscient =df:Jp [Ksp == (OKsp & Tp). 
Now we have made explicit the idea that to be omniscient is to know all and 
only those true propositions that it is possible for the individual to know. 
Since this definition is not his primary concern, Bringsjord does not go into 
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detail about the motivating assumptions concerning knowledge of "what it is 
like." In particular, he does not say how we might fill in the blank to produce 
a true proposition, and he does not say why God could not know such truths. 
But we can get some idea of his view from the articles he cites by Frank 
Jackson and Earl Conee. 2 
The issue between Jackson and Conee is whether there is non-physical 
information that is known in sensation or perceptual experience, knowledge 
of qualia (special properties of these mental states). Jackson believes so, but 
while Conee agrees there is special information gotten from the experience, 
he argues that it is physical information. Jackson does not say that having the 
experience is necessary for acquiring the knowledge, but Conee does. This 
is probably the relevant point for Bringsjord. He must be thinking that God 
would have to experience ignorance, to actually be ignorant, in order to know 
what it is like, but cannot possibly do so. He would be taking 'perceptual 
experience' broadly, to include direct experience of aspects of one's mental 
state. He is particularly interested in our experience of aspects associated 
with our finite perspective. 
Conee argues that the special knowledge gained in perceptual experience 
can be expressed using the adverb 'thusly.' This suggests that one way to fill 
in our blank would be to assert that ignorance is experienced thusly, referring 
to our own immediate mental state. Or we could assert that being ignorant 
is like this, where, again, 'this' refers to our immediate mental state. And 
Bringsjord is right that this may very well express propositional content. 
Advocates of the purely referential proposition would analyze the content 
differently than descriptionists. 
If there is propositional content here, and experiencing ignorance were 
required to know these truths but God could not experience ignorance, then 
God's omniscience could not be knowledge of all truths. And we might be 
tempted to consider D'. 
I want to suggest that omniscience definers should challenge the assump-
tion that having the experience is necessary for knowing what it is like, or 
the assumption that God could not have such experiences, or the assumption 
that there is propositional content in knowledge of "what it is like." There is 
no use accepting the assumptions and turning to D' for help, because D' would 
still require God to do what God cannot possibly do. 
Suppose we grant the assumptions. Presumably, Christians will want to say 
that it is logically possible that God know what it is like always to have 
favored Abel's offering over Cain's. But since this preference is seemingly 
not necessary, it should be equally logically possible that God know what it 
is like always to have favored Cain's offering over Abel's. If there is propo-
sitional content here, then there are (at least) two true propositions, each of 
which is such that it is possibly known by God. Then, by D', God must know 
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both. But, by assumption, it is impossible that God know both propositions 
since knowing them entails being in the states to which they refer, and it is 
not logically possible to be in both of those states. So, by the original as-
sumptions, D' requires that God do something that is logically impossible. 
It might be suggested that this example is flawed since God cannot actually 
favor an offering. Perhaps, though, I will eventually be able to think of an 
example consistent with generally acceptable theological restrictions. But 
why should we have to? Shouldn't we be able to define omniscience without 
recourse to special theological considerations? 
Special theological restrictions aside, it would seem to be logically possi-
ble, for an omniscient being s, that s know what it is like always to have 
loved poetry, and it would also seem to be logically possible that s know what 
it is like never to have loved poetry. The original assumptions imply that there 
are (at least) two true propositions here, each of which is such that it is 
possibly known by an omniscient being. But the assumptions also make it 
impossible to know both, since no being can have always loved poetry and 
also have never loved poetry. Therefore, on the original assumptions, since 
D' requires knowing both of these propositions, it requires that an omniscient 
being do something that is logically impossible. 
In light of these examples, it seems that anyone who accepts the original 
assumptions should conclude that an omniscient being should not be required 
to meet the conditions of D', either. This result parallels problems for defining 
omnipotence that were raised in 1967 by James Cargile. 3 
At this point we could reevaluate the assumptions. Perhaps it is not logi-
cally necessary, in order to know what it is like to be __ , that one be __ 
at some time. In that case, the move to DID' might not have been needed, 
since perhaps God could remain God and know what it is like to be ignorant. 
Or, perhaps we are mistaken in thinking there is propositional content in our 
examples. 
Let us suppose that there is propositional content in the examples and focus 
on alternative ways of knowing it. In the case of omnipotence, it was sug-
gested that for any power it is possible to have-including the power to build 
a rock too heavy for the builder to lift, and other such problematic powers-
there is some power that it is possible for God to have that is the same as the 
first power (see note 3, Cargile, 1967). To create a rock too heavy for me to 
lift, the only power I really have to exercise is the power to create that rock. 
The rest follows merely by virtue of my being weak. But God can have this 
power. 
Similarly, it may be that when I know what it is like to be ignorant, I just 
know certain things about my human perspective that God could know. Per-
haps it is just to know that my perspective contains certain knowledge but 
lacks other knowledge. God might even be able to be acquainted with a 
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qualitative duplicate of my perspective to know what I know of this, as long 
as there were infinitely more than that to God. In the case of Spinoza's God, 
the whole is not rendered imperfect by the inadequate ideas it contains. 
These are, of course, only the beginnings of clear speculations. But, it is 
not my intention here to define omniscience. I do hope to have shown how 
the assumptions behind one current attempt should be taken by anyone who 
accepts them to undermine that attempt. 
Bringsjord's definition of omniscience has also been challenged by Patrick 
Grim.4 Grim argues that a traditional account of propositional omniscience 
may fail due to Cantorian problems for the possibility of a set of all truths, 
or even a set of all truths that it is possible for an omniscient being to know. 
However, Grim admits that there are unsettled issues regarding these matters 
that may yet provide an escape route. 
The Cantorian discussion aside, Grim sees other difficulties for 0 and 0'. 
First, both definitions allow that an omniscient being might hold false beliefs, 
and thereby be inconsistent. Secondly, they allow any being who is essentially 
ignorant (Grim's example, named Necessary McIg, is supposed to be es-
sentially such that it knows only that it is conscious), as well as any being 
that is essentially non-conscious (Grim mentions tomato juice), to qualify 
as omniscient. 
The first problem is easily overcome simply by adding to 0' that s holds 
no false beliefs. 
The second objection is based on a highly suspect notion. Anyone who 
recognizes metaphysical necessity and possibility should have grave doubts 
about the possibility of Necessary McIg. How could a mind be metaphysically 
necessarily such that it knows only that it is conscious? It seems possible, for 
any finite mind at least, that it could change with respect to its knowledge. 
As for tomato juice, setting aside somewhat more obscure worries over the 
possibility of a metaphysically necessarily non-conscious being, once again 
we need only restrict 0', this time to beings capable of consciousness, to 
avoid the issue. 
But even after 0' is thus modified, and even if the Cantorian discussion 
eventually goes against Grim, if I have been correct I have shown that on the 
other assumptions Bringsjord has considered, 0' would still ask too much of 
an omniscient being-that it be able to do what it cannot possibly do. It would 
not be logically possible that God know everything that it is logically possible 
for God to know. My suggestion is that we look more closely at those as-
sumptions, specifically at what is involved in knowing what it is like to be 
ignorant, etc. 
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